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THE FORM AND SUBSTANCE OF A MERGER: A READING
OF FARRIS v. GLEN ALDEN CORP.
JAN G. DEUTSCHt
Editor's Preface
THE STYLE OF the following article, while not unusual for the
author,a is likely to be quite unfamiliar to the reader. The article
offers a multifaceted analysis of the subject under consideration and
employs a method whereby the reader is continually exposed to slightly
varied factual patterns which give insight into the reasoning of the
decisionmaking bodies. The technique, in effect, forces the reader to-
ward the conclusion while offering little in the way of customary con-
crete guidelines. Thus, the article's unorthodox approach and com-
plexity require considerable effort from the reader. Accordingly, this
brief preface and several editors' notes have been provided to assist the
reader.
Successful judicial opinions serve at least two functions: they
resolve a particular controversy before the court and, at the same time,
contribute to the continuing development of a viable legal doctrine. In
a few instances, moreover, an opinion may provide an impetus for
academic comment upon the merits of the decision and the doctrine it
represents.
The decision of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Farris 'lI.
Glen Alden Corp. b is such an opinion. In this article, Professor Deutsch r
offers a functional basis for the de facto merger doctrine espoused by
the Farris court, indicates how academicians have distorted that de-
cision, and demonstrates the significance of the de facto merger doctrine
for various professionals.
- The Editors
Lay incomprehensibility being necessary to professional status, the
function of a profession is the practise of mysteries, and the profession
will remain economically viable only so long as new members can
continue to master the strange compound of empiricism and super-
stition whereby doctrines deemed crucial by the laity can simultaneously
t Professor of Law, Yale University. B.A., Yale University, 1955; M.A., Clare
College, Cambridge, 1963; LL.B., Ph.D., Yale University, 1962.
a. See Deutsch, Perlman v. Feldmann: A Case Study in Contemporary Legal
History, 8 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 1 (1974); Deutsch, Precedent and Adjudication, 83
YALE L.r 1553 (1973).
b. 393 Pa. 427, 143 A.2d 25 (1958).
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be manipulated and remain mysterious. What follows is my reading
of such a mystery: a doctrine created by a decision in which the Supreme




The holding of Farris v. Glen Alden Corp. was that:
[T]he combination contemplated by the reorganization agree-
ment, although consummated by contract rather than in accordance
with the statutory procedure, is a merger within the protective
purview of sections ... of the corporation law. The shareholders
of Glen Alden should have been notified accordingly and advised
of their statutory rights of dissent and appraisal. The failure of the
corporate officers to take these steps renders the stockholder ap-
proval of the agreement at the 1958 shareholders' meeting invalid.1
On February 2, 1971, James L. Lopata, a Pennsylvania resident,
was injured at his employer's plant in New Jersey while attempting
to unjam an allegedly defective machine which had been manufactured
by the Rock Wool Engineering and Equipment Company.2 Pursuant
to an agreement executed upon March 31, 1966, Rock Wool had sold
the bulk of its assets to Bemis Company, Inc. (which continued to
manufacture similar machines), had subsequently changed its corporate
name to Overman & Shovlin, and had eventually dissolved in April,
1967.3 In the proceedings brought by Lopata against Bemis, the federal
district court held that there was no issue as to fact, and that the govern-
ing legal principle was that a sale of corporate property by one company
to another does not render the purchaser liable for unassumed liabilities
of the seHer unless, inter alia, the transaction amounted to a merger.4
Citing Farris, Lopata argued that the transaction between the two
companies constituted a de facto merger and consequently fell within
the exception to the general rule.5
1. Farris v. Glen Alden Corp., 393 Pa. 427, 438, 143 A.2d 25, 31 (1958).
2. Lopata v. Bemis Co., 383 F. Supp. 342, 343 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
3. ld.
4. !d. at 344.
5. ld. at 344-45. See also In re Penn Cent. Sec. Litigation, 367 F. Supp. 1158
(E.D. Pa. 1973), where the court stated:
That the concept of a de facto merger has until now been applied mainly to
lawsuits by dissenting shareholders seeking rights of appraisal does not mean
that it may be used only in that situation. We can discern no reason either in
the origin of the doctrine or in the cases applying it why it should be so limited.
The de facto merger doctrine is a judge-made device for avoiding patent injustice
which might befall a party simply because a merger has been called something
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In Farris v. Glen Alden Corp., the court began by defining the
issue presented for decision:
We are required to determine on this appeal whether, as a
result of a "Reorganization Agreement" executed by the officers
of Glen Alden Corporation and List Industries Corporation, and
approved by the shareholders of the former company, the rights
and remedies of a dissenting shareholder accrue to the plaintiff.o
Later in its opinion, the Farris court noted that:
The gravamen of the complaint was that the notice of the
annual shareholders' meeting did not conform to the requirements
of the Business Corporation Law in three respects: (1) It did not
give notice to the shareholders that the true intent and purpose of
the meeting was to effect a merger or consolidation of Glen Alden
and List; (2) It failed to give notice to the shareholders of their
right to dissent to the plan of merger or consolidation and claim
fair value for their shares, and (3) It did not contain copies of the
text of certain sections of the Business Corporation Law as
required.7
Analyzing the decision, Professor Folk noted that:
The de facto merger holding was based on a variety of factors
which the court found in the transaction, including a complete
change in the nature of the corporation's business, the doubling of
the size of the successor corporation, a shift in control of the board
of directors to the selling corporation, the purchaser's assumption
of the seller's liabilities, a reduction of the proportionate interest
of the purchasing corporation's shareholders in the successor cor-
poration plus a sharp drop in the book value of their shares, and
the fact that the selling corporation dissolved and distributed the
shares it received to its shareholders. Evidently, in the court's
view, no one of these factors alone can transform an assets sale
into a merger, but the court did not disclose the precise combination
of factors which would. Indeed, some of the factors are to be found
in many assets sales of impeccable legitimacy.s
else. The deprivation of a corporation's right to sue under § 10(b) and Rule
10b-5 because the equivalent of a merger has been achieved by a roundabout
transaction is as much an injustice as the deprivation of a shareholder's right of
appraisal, and makes it necessary for a court to look at the substance of the
transaction rather than its form.
[d. at 1170.
6. 393 Pa. 427, 428,143 A.2d 25,26 (1958).
7. [d. at 430-31,143 A.2d at 27 (footnote omitted),
8. Folk, De Facto Mergers in Delaware: Rariton v. Arco Electronics, Inc.,
49 VA, L. REv. 1261, 1266 (1963).
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Comparing the actions of the Farris court with such Delaware
decisions as Heilbrunn v. Sun Chemical Corj).,9 Hariton v. Area Elec-
tronics, Inc.,l0 and Orzeck v. Englehart,ll Professor Folk concluded
that the Pennsylvania decision was inadequate for three reasons: First,
"these individual factors seem only marginally relevant, at best, to the
question when a sale of assets becomes a de facto merger."12 Second, "a
de facto merger test based on some combination of factors is unsettling
to the security of transactions when it is impossible or difficult to state
the disqualifying factors, for no objective standard is available lor
measuring a proposed transaction in advance."13 And third, "assuming
that some of these factors are indicative of a 'real' merger, it is question-
9. 38 Del. Ch. 321, 150 A,2d 755 (Sup. Ct. 1959), aff'g 37 Del. Ch. 552, 146 A,2d
757 (Ch. 1958).
[Editors' note] In Heilbrunn, two corporations had agreed to a plan under
which one would purchase all the assets of the other with stock, the selling corpora-
tion to distribute the stock to its shareholders and then dissolve. A shareholder of
the purchasing corporation attacked the plan as invalid upon the ground that it was
a de facto merger which would deny him statutorily required appraisal rights. Id. at
323-24, 150 A,2d at 756-57. The Supreme Court of Delaware held the plan valid
under the overlapping merger and sale of assets sections of the Delaware corpora-
tion law. Id. at 325, 150 A,2d at 757. The de facto merger doctrine was held in-
applicable because there had been no injury to the purchaser's shareholder since:
(1) the business of the purchaser would continue as before; (2) the shareholder had
not been forced to accept stock in another corporation; and (3) the essential nature
of the purchaser remained unchanged. Id. at 326, 150 A.2d at 758.
10. 41 Del. Ch. 74, 188 A,2d 123 (Sup. Ct. 1963), aff'g 40 Del. Ch. 326, 182 A,2d
22 (Ch. 1962).
[Editors' note] In Hariton, two corporations had entered into a "reorganiza-
tion" plan whereby one agreed to sell its assets to the other in return for stock of
the purchaser. Such stock was to be distributed to the stockholders of the seller, and
the selling corporation was then to dissolve. A shareholder of the seller attacked the
validity of the plan, claiming it was a de facto merger in which no appraisal rights
were granted as required by the merger section of Delaware's corporation law. Id. at
75-76, 188 A,2d at 124. The Supreme Court of Delaware held that the validity of a
corporate act under one section of Delaware's corporation law was not dependent
upon its validity under another section. Therefore, while the results of the instant
transaction were the same as a merger yet the plan did not comply with the merger
section of the statute, it was nonetheless valid since it did meet the requirements of
Delaware's sale of assets section. Id., 188 A,2d at 125.
11. 41 Del. Ch. 223, 192 A.2d 36 (Ch. 1963).
[Editors' note] In Orzeck, a corporation's plan to purchase the stock of seven
other corporations was attacked by a shareholder who claimed it would result in a
de facto merger which would be unlawful for failure to comply with the merger
section of Delaware's corporation law. Id. at 224-25, 192 A,2d at 36-37. The Dela-
ware Court of Chancery upheld the plan upon the grounds that: (1) the plan com-
plied with a separate section of the Delaware corporation law and hence was valid
since the various sections of the corporation law were independent of each other;
and (2) that the de facto merger doctrine was inapplicable because the relationship
created by the stock sale was not the same as that created by a merger, and in the
instant case there was to be no essential change in the nature of the purchasing cor-
poration. Id. at 227-28, 192 A,2d at 38-39. The Delaware Supreme Court opinion,
which had not yet issued when Professor Folk's article was written, affirmed, upon
similar grounds. Orzeck v. Englehart, 41 Del. Ch. 361, 195 A,2d 375 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
12. Folk, supra note 8, at 1275.
13. I d. at 1276.
HeinOnline -- 20 Vill. L. Rev. 84 1975
84 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 20: p. 80
able whether a court on its own should declare standards supplementary
to whatever standards the statute provides."14
That the Delaware cases surveyed by Professor Folk were rooted
in the particular view of legislative power underlying his third criticism
of Farris is illustrated by the statement of the Delaware Court of
Chancery in Hariton that, "\Vhile plaintiff's contention that the doctrine
of de factor merger should be applied in the present circumstances is not
without appeal, the subject is one which, in my opinion, is within the
legislative domain."15 It should be noted, however, that the rationale
offered by the H ariton court to justify its opinion is based not upon
legislative authority, but upon the fact that
[T] here is authority in decisions of courts of this state for
the proposition that the various sections of the Delaware Corpora-
tion Law conferring authority for corporate action are independent
of each other and that a given result may be accomplished by
proceeding under one section which is not possible, or is even
forbidden under another. lo
and that "[a] holding in the stockholder's favor would be directly
contrary to the theory of the cited cases."17 Moreover, the Supreme
Court of Delaware strikingly confined its conflict with the Pennsyl-
vania decision to this precise formulation:
We do not intend to be understood as holding that the doctrine
of de facto merger is not recognized in Delaware ....
We note that the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has rejected
the theory, firmly embodied in the Delaware Corporation Law, of
the independent legal significance of action taken under one section
of that law, as opposed to other sections. If that is the holding in
the Farris case, as we think it is, we decline to accept it as per-
suasive.Is
14. !d. at 1277.
15. 40 Del. Ch. at 331-32, 182 A,2d at 25.
16. Id. at 333,182 A,2d at 26.
17. !d. at 334, 182 A,2d at 27.
[Editors' note] The cases cited by the H arritoll court were: Hotzemstein v.
York Ice Mach. Corp., 45 F. Supp. 436 (D. Del. 1942), aff'd, 136 F.2d 944 (3d Cir.
1943); and Federal United Corp. v. Havender, 24 Del. Ch. 318, 11 A,2d 331 (Sup.
Ct. 1940), motion for leave to file bill of review dmied, 146 F.2d 835 (3d Cir. 1944),
cert. denied, 325 U.S. 886 (1945). These cases stand for the proposition that while
the elimination of accrued dividends upon preferred stock through amendment of the
corporate charter is prohibited by one section of the corporation law, the prohibited
elimination can be accomplished through compliance with the merger statute.
18. Orzeck v. Englehart, 41 Del. Ch. 361, 367, 195 A,2d 375, 378 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
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The Farris opinion clearly indicates that its holding was rooted
in judicial rather than iegislative law-making authority:
[IJ t is no longer helpful to consider an individual transaction in
the abstract and solely by reference to the various elements therein
determine whether it is a "merger" or a "sale." Instead, to deter-
mine properly the nature of a corporate transaction, we must refer
not only to all the provisions of the agreement, but also to the
consequences of the transaction and to the purposes of the pro-
visions of the corporation law said to be applicable ....III
[TheJ prOVISIOn [held to be applicableJ had its origin in the
early decision of this Court [in whichJ a shareholder who objected
to the consolidation of his company with another was held to have
a right in the absence of statute to treat the consolidation as a
dissolution of his company and to receive the value of his shares
upon their surrender.20
[DJefendants contend that the 1957 amendments to ... the
corporation law preclude us from reaching [ourJ result and require
the entry of judgment in their favor ....21
Defendants view these amendments as abridging the right of
shareholders to dissent to a transaction between two corporations
which involves a transfer of assets for a consideration even though
the transfer has all the legal incidents of a merger. They claim that
only if the merger is accomplished in accordance with the prescribed
statutory procedure does the right of dissent accrue. In support
of this position they cite to us the comment on the amendments by
the Committee on Corporation Law of the Pennsylvania Bar Asso-
ciation, the committee which originally drafted these provisions.
The comment states that the provisions were intended to overrule
cases which granted shareholders the right to dissent to a sale of as-
sets when accompanied by the legal incidents of a merger .... What-
ever may have been the intent of the committee. there is no evidence
to indicate that the legislature intended the 1957 amendments to
have the effect contended for .... To divest shareholders of [theJ
19. 393 Pa. at 432, 143 A.2d at 28. .
20. ld. at 433, 143 A.2d at 2Y. The court referred to Lauman v. Lebanon Valley
R.R., 30 Pa. 42 (1858), where the court had stated:
By [the transaction before the court] the Lebanon company loses its actual
identity, abandons its name, and therefore its legal identity and its corporate
existence, and can no longer claim any legal recognition. This is called a merger
of the Lebanon corporation into the other; but such a merger is a dissolution,
destroying the actual identity of both, while the legal identity of one of them
is preserved.
ld. at 45.
21. 393 Pa. at 435, 143 A.2d at 30. The amendments referred to by the Farris
Court were: Act of July 11, 1957, §§ 311(F), 908(C), [1957] Pa. Laws 725, 759
(amended 1959).
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right of dissent under [the] circumstances [before us] would
require express languag~ which is absent from the 1957 amend-
ments. 22
That legislative behavior did not invalidate the premises upon
which was based the defendants' argument concerning the relevance of
Bar Association comments to the question of statutory intent, was
demonstrated by the Pennsylvania legislature's adoption in 195923 of
further amendments, described in the following terms by the Bar Asso-
ciation committee that drafted them:
In order to overcome [the Farris] decision the proposed amend-
ment will change slightly the language of [the merger and sale of
assets provisions] to clarify questions raised by the courts in the
Farris case. The bill also contains in its title a statement that one
of its features is to abolish the doctrine of de facto merger or con-
solidation .... This may seem an extreme measure to demonstrate
the intention of the legislature but under legislative practice in
Pennsylvania and the decision of the Supreme Court in the Farris
case no other method of demonstrating such an intention (which
the courts would consider) has occurred to the Committee.2-1
Possibly aware that the statutory provision according appraisal
rights to a shareholder who objected to a "plan of merger or consolida-
tion" was not in itself determinative of the case before it, the Farris
court concluded its opinion with the argument that:
Even were we to assume that the combination provided for
in the reorganization agreement is a "sale of assets" ... it would
avail the defendants nothing; we will not blind our eyes to the
realities of the transaction. Despite the designation of the parties
and the form employed, Glen Alden does not in fact acquire List;
rather, List acquires Glen Alden ... and . .. the right of dissent
would remain with the shareholders of Glen Alden.25
However, this argument is subject to criticism. The reorganization
agreement provided that Glen Alden Corporation, after acquiring all
the assets of List, would change its name to List Alden Corporation;
that List would then dissolve; and that List Alden would carryon the
operations of both former corporations.26 Given these provisions, and
assuming that the court's finding that "Despite the designation of the
22. 393 Pa. at 436-38, 143 A.2d at 30-31.
23. Act of Nov, 10, 1959, §§ 311(F), 908(C), [1959] Pa. Laws 1410, 1431 (now
PA. STAT, ANN. tit. 15, §§ 1311 (F), 1908(C) (1974).
24. 64 PA. B. ASS'N ANNUAL REP. 151-52 (1959).
25. 393 Pa. at 438, 143 A.2d at 31.
26. Id. at 429-30, 143 A.2d at 27.
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parties and the form employed ... List acquires Glen Alden" implied
that it was Glen Alden rather than List that was to be dissolved, then
the specific terms of the very statutory provision upon which the court
re1ied27 prohibited the transaction being scrutinized.28
Given this reading of the opinion, the question about the justifi-
cation for the result reached must be answered: what in fact was the
basis for the decision rendered by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania?
c.
Professor Folk summarized the basis of his preference for the
Delaware decisions as follows:
The basic premise implicitly adopted in Raritan may perhaps
be stated more affirmatively. One does not invest in a unique
corporate entity or even a particular business operation, but rather
in a continuous course of business which changes over a long
period of time. Certainly the best investments are growth invest-
ments - investments in enterprises which change with time, tech-
nology, business opportunities, and altered demand; and the worst
investments are those which .diminish in value because the type of
business has lost importance and the corporation has been unable
to adapt to the changed conditions. Although a shareholder's
enthusiasm dwindles when an enterprise changes internally for the
worst, no one suggests that he should have an option to compel
the return of his investment. Viewed this way, the fact that the
change - for better or for worse - comes throug-h marriage,
whether by merger or assets sale, seems purely incidental. The
fact that the corporate entity in which one invested disappears as
a result of a merger or of a sale of assets coupled with dissolution
27. The Farris Court relied on the following statute:
If any shareholder of a business corporation which sells . . . all or sub-
stantially all of its property otherwise than . .. (3) in connection with its dis~
solutiol£ . . . shall object to such sale . . . such shareholder shall be entitled to
the rights and remedies of dissenting shareholders ....
[d. at 438 n.8, 143 A.2d at 31 n.8, quoting Act of July 11, 1957, § 31l(D), [1957] Pa.
Laws 725, (amended 1959) (emphasis added).
28. See, in this connection, the discussion of the Lauman case, note 20 supra.
See also PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 131l(A) (1967), containing the 1957 amendment
to the Pennsylvania Business Corporation Law which provides that a sale of assets
in connection with dissolution is governed by statutory provisions which fail to grant
appraisal rights. Cf. Orzeck v. Englehart, 41 Del. Ch. 361, 195 A.2d 375 (Sup. Ct.
1963), where the court stated:
I t is true that the Vice Chancellor in the Fidanque case laid stress on the
absence of any agreement for the liquidation or dissolution of the selling cor-
poration, but we think the point not decisive of the question. The plan in the
H eilbrltlm case to effect a reorganization by the sale of assets in fact required
the dissolution of the selling corporation but we held that fact did not make the
transaction a merger.
[d. at 366-67, 195 A.2d at 378.
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is also beside the point. One's investment may gain immortality
when it takes a new form, i.e., a share in a successor enterprise. 29
The Farris opinion clearly indicated the extent to which its holding
was premised upon a denial of Professor Folk's argument:
The rationale of the Lauman case, and of the present section
of the Business Corporation Law based thereon, is that when a
corporation combines with another so as to lose its essential nature
and alter the original fundamental relationships of the shareholders
among themselves and to the corporation, a shareholder who does
not wish to continue his membership therein may treat his member-
ship in the original corporation as terminated and have the value
of his shares paid to him.30
Given this fact, it is important that in both the H eilbrunn31 and
OrzecJi:32 decisions the Delaware courts explicitly stated the basis for
their beliefs that the records before them permitted a judicial finding of
substantial equivalence in the shareholder's interest before and after
the corporate transaction. It should also be noted, in this connection,
that the applicability of the Farris decision was rejected in Lopata 7.1.
Bemis Co., 33 upon the basis that
[i] n the instant case, no basic fundamental change in the relation-
ship of the stockholders to their respective corporations occurred
and without this essential element, the de facto merger argument
must fail. A fortl:ori, without any legal change in the ownership
29. Folk, supra note 8, at 1280-81 (footnotes omitted).
30. 393 Pa. at 433, 143 A.2d at 29.
31. In Heilbrunn v. Sun Chern. Corp., 38 Del. Ch. 321, 150 A.2d 755 (Sup. Ct.
1959), the court stated:
[Wje fail to see how any injury has been inflicted upon the Sun stockholders.
Their corporation has simply acquired property and paid for it in shares of stock.
The business of Sun will go on as before, with additional assets. The Sun stock-
holder is not forced to accept stock in another corporation. Nor has the reorgani-
zation changed the essential nature of the enterprise of the purchasing corporation,
as in Farris . ...
ld. at 326, 150 A.2d at 758.
32. In Orzeck v. Englehart, 41 Del. Ch. 223, 192 A.2d 36 (Ch. 1963), the
court stated:
Plaintiff contends that the purchase by the corporation of the Olson com-
panies' stock has resulted in a change in the essential nature of the enterprise of
the corporation. The fallacy of this contention is readily apparent. By virtue of
the transaction complained of the corporation became merely a holding company.
I t did not thereby become engaged in the egg business. So far as business enter-
prise was concerned it' remained that "empty shell" as characterized by plaintiff.
ld. at 228, 192 A.2d at 38-39.
33. 383 F. Supp. 342 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
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configuration of the two corporations, the contention that a merger
or consolidation has occurred also fails. 34
It remains, however, for one to formulate in reasonably precise
terms why the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reached its result in
Farris.
D.
The starting point for any such formulation must be the insight
that:
[OJ ne's history is a part of his present. Monuments often
outlive the philosophies they were built to glorify. The pyramids
are one example. The appraisal statutes are another. To the
nineteenth century mind contemplating such matters, a corporate
merger was a major and significant event. In the first place it
involved a species of corporate assassination. A "corporation"
died. A three-dimensional thing, created by the sovereign legis-
lature, had passed away. These things were not matters to be
taken casually. But something else happened, too. The share-
holders of corporation A somehow became shareholders of cor-
poration B and no longer shareholders of corporation A. The
mere statement of such a preposterous proposition did violence to
fundamental principles. How could a man who owned a horse
suddenly find that he owned a cow? Furthermore - or perhaps
this is but another statement of the same point - even if this
transmutation could somehow be brought off, surely it could not
constitutionally be done without the owner's consent. You might
try to persuade him to sell his horse or to exchange it for a cow,
but surely you could not whisk it away from him. Freedom of
contract, rights of property, Constitution, law, and morals would
forbid it, even if the leger de11tain for the conversion had been
mastered. Given a nineteenth century view of freedom of contract
this line of reasoning required only one premise: A "corporation"
34. Id. at 345. But see Knapp v. North American Rockwell Corp., 506 F.2d 361
(3d Cir. 1974).
[Editors' note] In Kn,app, an employee was injured by a defective machine
which previously had been purchased from the manufacturer. Prior to the accident,
the manufacturer had contracted to sell all its assets to another corporation in e:t-
change for stock of the purchaser, to distribute the stock to its shareholders, and
then to dissolve as soon as practicable. The employee sued the purchaser corpora-
tion for damages claiming it was the manufacturer's successor and liable for his
injuries. Id. at 362-63. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
held that under Pennsylvania law, the purchasing corporation· was liable since the
transaction had been a merger - the finding of a merger based, not upon the fulfill-
ment of formalities, but upon the public policy consideration that the purchasing cor-
poration was more financially able to spread the loss involved. Id. at 369-70.
A comparison of the Knapp case with the Lo/'ata decision leads one to the
conclusion that had the Knapp holding existed at the time Lopata was decided, the
result in Lopata would have been different.
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is just like a horse. The law of the last century had no doubt that
it was.35
Applying this historical assessment of the function served by ap-
praisal rights, the then-Professor Manning noted that:
[T] 0 the nineteenth century mind, mergers were deeply sus-
pect. When commercial pressures forced the enactment of the
general merger statutes, the function of the appraisal statutes was
clear. They met a conceptual and ideological problem - how to
preserve the constitutionality of the merger statutes.36
The historical focus of the Farris opinion, however, was upon the
fact that
[W]hen use of the corporate form of business organization
first became widespread, it was relatively easy for courts to define
a "merger" or a "sale of assets" and to label a particular transaction
as one or the other .... But prompted by the desire to avoid the
impact of adverse, and to obtain the benefits of favorable, govern-
ment regulations, particularly federal tax laws, new accounting
and legal techniques were developed by lawyers and accountants
which interwove the elements characteristic of each, thereby creat-
ing hybrid forms of corporate amalgamation. Thus, it is no longer
helpful to consider an individual transaction in the abstract and
solely by reference to the various elements therein determine
whether it is a "merger" or a "sale." Instead, to determine prop-
erly the nature of a corporate transaction, we must refer not only
to all the provisions of the agreement, but also to the consequences
of the transaction and to the purposes of the provisions of the
corporation law said to be applicable.37
More recently, in response to Professor Manning's argument that
the assertion of appraisal rights may destroy the enterprise, one com-
mentator has stated:
The gravity of the "threat to the corporate enterprise" seems highly
exaggerated. No evidence is adduced that corporations involved
in mergers are "in need of a blood transfusion," and my own ob-
servation has been that most mergers involve two perfectly healthy
enterprises.38
35. Manning, The Shareholder's Appraisal Remedy: An Essay For Frank Coker,
72 YALE L.]. 223, 246 (1962).
36. [d. (footnote omitted).
37. 393 Pa. at 432, 143 A.2d at 28. See also note 18 and accompanying text supra.
-38. Eisenberg, The Legal Roles of Shareholders and Management in Modern
Corporate Decisiomnaking, 57 CALIF. L. REv. 1, 73 (1969).
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In terms of the de facto merger doctrine, however, what seems
important is that the Farris opinion explicitly noted that "if the cor-
poration is required to pay the dissenting shareholders the appraised
fair value of their shares, the resultant drain of cash would prevent Glen
Alden from carrying out the agreement."39
In short, whether constitutionally mandated or not,40 the crucial
fact concerning dissenters' rights such as those created by the Farris
opinion is that they perform, in connection with a proposed corporate
transaction, the function that has historically been performed by con-
stitutional decisions rendered by the Supreme Court of the United
States: the provision, for those affected by the legal acts under scrutiny,
of the opportunity for a "sober second thought."
The case study that follows is presented in the hope that it will
to some extent illumine the value of that function and, in so doing,
demonstrate the significance of the legal doctrine of de facto merger.
II.
A.
Accompanying a proxy statement, a letter dated March 20, 1959,
from the Board of Directors to the shareholders of Glen Alden Cor-
poration reported:
After extended consideration, your Directors have now ap-
proved the combination of the business and assets of your Cor-
poration and List Industries Corporation, pursuant to a Merger
Agreement entered into March 6, 1959. Glen Alden Corporation
would be the continuing corporation without change of name.41
The described merger was accomplished upon April 21, 1959.
In Gilbert v. Burnside,42 an opinion dated December 31, 1959,
the New York Supreme Court, Special Term, Kings County, Part III,
wrote that
[i]t is generally held that where directors seek legal advice
and honestly act under it they are protected from personal liability
39. 393 Pa. at 431 n.5, 143 A.2d at 28 n.5.
40. See Eisenberg, supra note 38, where the author states:
Manning's argument that appraisal rights have a constitutional genesis is at
best a minority view. Most commentators hold the opinion that the legislatures
conferred appraisal rights on dissenting shareholders as a matter of fairness, not
as a matter of constitutional compulsion.
ld. at 78 (footnote omitted).
41. Letter from Board of Directors of Glen Alden Corporation to shareholders,
March 20, 1959 (copy on file at the Villanova Law Review).
42. 197 N.Y.S.2d 623 (Sup. Ct. 1959), rev'd, 13 ApI'. Div. 2d 982, 216 N.Y.S.2d
430 (1961), aff'd, 11 N.Y.2d 960, 183 N.E.2d 325, 229 N.Y.S.2d 10 (1962).
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However, I do not believe that any immunity under these
rules can be granted to the directors herein. I find that the directors
did not rely on counsel's advice but utilized the method of imple-
menting the agreement as a device solely for the purpose of evading
the impact of the merger laws of Pennsylvania .... The original
Glen Alden directors were not primarily concerned with the form
in which the transaction was to be concluded. However, despite
their knowledge that a palpable and patent device of a simulated
sale to Glen Alden of these assets was to be employed to avoid the
requirements of the merger law for appraisal rights they permitted
the agreement to be projected in the illegal fashion. 43
B.
In response to the criticism of two reports upon Episcopal theo-
logical education that "small seminaries operating in physical and
sectarian isolation from each other ... simply cannot effectively respond
to [the] educational challenge,"44 a 1969 feasibility study dealing with
one such serninary - Berkeley Divinity School - assessed a method
of meeting such a charge:
Berkeley could become an Episcopal Center for [Yale Divinity
School], offering Anglican studies and scholarships to Episcopal
students. This would make a strong school stronger and thereby
promote theological education in general, while still using its
endowment in service to the Episcopal Church . . . .
The trouble with this idea is that Berkeley would lose its
identity or at least its independence . . . . If it specialized in
Anglican studies, this would be a new venture. It does not do that
now. And the value of preserving denominational purity in our day
is limited. 45
On June 30, 1971, an Affiliation Agreement was entered into
between Berkeley Divinity School and Yale University. The Agree-
ment contained the recital that
Berkeley desires to improve the training and instruction of its
students for the sacred ministry in the Protestant Episcopal Church
by providing for them a strengthened academic preparation in a
strong ecumenical background available through closer association
with the larger faculty, student body and resources of the Yale
Divinity School . . . . Berkeley has further determined that by
means of a closer affiliation with Yale Divinity School the material
resources of Berkeley can be made to produce a larger effectiveness
43. I d. at 633-34.
44. McCollough, Feasibility Study: Berkeley Divinity School (December 31,
1969) at 13 (copy on file at Villanova Law Review).
45. ld. at 44.
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in the training and instruction of students for the sacred ministry
of the Protestant Episcopal Church by being devoted less to the
maintenance of separate establishments in administration, libraries,
land, buildings and other facilities, and more to such training and
instruction.46
The specific agreements entered into included the following pro-
VlSlOns:
Except as expressly herein provided each of Yale and Berkeley
shall retain unencumbered title and possession of its property and
assets, and each shall separately control all of its property and
affairs.47
During the term of this Agreement Yale and Berkeley shall
each have the option of terminating this Agreement as of the
last day of June in any year, which option shall be exercisable by
either in its sole discretion.48
By a separate written agreement (Real Estate Agreement)
of even date herewith Berkeley and Yale have provided for the
sale by Berkeley to Yale of the real estate of Berkeley. The Real
Estate Agreement and this Affiliation Agreement are independent.
No amendment or termination of any provision of either shall
affect the other, and no failure to perform any provision of one of
them shall be a defense to an action based on a failure to perform
the other. The invalidity of one in whole or in part shall not
affect any of the legal relations created by the other. 411
The Affiliation Agreement further provided that "within a reason-
able time after July 1, 1975 [the parties] will arrange mutually for an
outside evaluation ... such outside evaluation to be completed on or
about January 1, 1976 ...."50 The two parties to the agreement agreed,
after studying the evaluation report, "to negotiate in good faith . . .
concerning the questions of whether to extend this Agreement, and if
to extend it, concerning the question of the revised terms and conditions.
if any, for such an extension."5!
During the spring semester of the 1973-74 academic year, an
interim evaluation was conducted "in order that the timetable for nego-
tiation of extension and changes in the agreement between the two
institutions could be moved up so that it could be concluded during the
46. Affiliation Agreement between Berkeley Divinity School and Yale University
(June 30, 1971) at 2 [hereinafter cited as Agreement] (copy on file at the Villallozla
Law Review). .
47. ld. at 6.
48. ld. at 12.
49. ld. at 13-14.
50. Id. at 12.
51. ld.
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1974-75 academic year and permit the 1975-76 academic year to be a
time of transition for any action that might be indicated ...."52
The report of that evaluation began by noting that what was being
assessed
has been established at Yale Divinity School as the result of an
affiliation between Berkeley Divinity School and Yale Divinity
School, not a merger between the two institutions. Although this
is plainly spelled out in the Affiliation Agreement, executed by
legal representatives of Berkeley Divinity and Yale University on
June 30, 1971 . . . many faculty members continue to refer to
"the merger" or profess to be surprised by the specific terms of
the Agreement. Most persons have not seen the legal documents of
the Agreement, but the terms are those which were set out in the
document ....53 '
This interim evaluation further noted:
At the time of negotiating the original agreement, the principal
issues were legal (how to guarantee the separate existence of the
two schools, and how to asure the use of Berkeley Divinity School's
resources for the program of the Berkeley Center) and academic
(how to set up core groups in the Center). These issues were first
scouted by the President-Dean of Berkeley Divinity School and
the Dean of Yale Divinity School. Then, the legal issues were put
into final form by the secretary of the Berkeley Board of Trustees
and the treasurer of Yale University, both of them lawyers; and
the academic issues were considered by the joint faculty-student
Berkeley Center Planning Committee, and approved by the Yale
Divinity School Faculty.54
At the heart of both the original agreement and the operation
of the Berkeley Center in its first three years has been a working
relationship between the Dean of Yale Divinity School ... and the
52. Interim Evaluation of the Berkeley Center under Terms of the Affiliation
Agreement between Berkeley Divinity School and Yale University (September, 1974)
at 1 [hereinafter cited as Evaluation] (copy on file at the Villanova Law Review).
53. Id. at 2.
54. Id. at 3-4. The Evaluation later stated:
The questions of purpose and curriculum will be complex enough in them-
selves, but they will become hopelessly complicated if it is not clear where the
planning for the School is done. We have already seen that the Berkeley Center
Planning Committee gave its principal attention to setting up the core groups.
Interviews with administration and faculty show that the School has had a
variety of ways by which educational planning has been done in the past, and
that it is less than clear where the responsibility lies at present ....
No evaluation will be possible at Yale Divinity School, whether of the
Berkeley Center or any other part of the program, unless it is clear who in the
School has responsibility for planning. In the meantime, everything is succeed-
ing and everything is failing, because it is impossible to tell what would con-
stitute an adequate accomplishment in the task of training for ministry that the
School has set for itself.
Id. at 6.
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Director of the Berkeley Center ... who is also an Associate Dean
of Yale Divinity School and President-Dean of Berkeley Divinity
School. Neither at the beginning during the planning year nor in
the three subsequent years has this been strictly a legal contract
or an administrative relationship. Each party has been able to
bring the strength of his institution to the partnership and been
able to rely on various kinds of political power for carrying out
his share of the relationship. In short, the working relationship has
been far more political than it has been legal and contractual or
administrative and organizational.55
Finally, the report evaluated the extent to which Episcopal expec-
tations had been fulfilled:
The other aspect of the affiliation to which this evaluation has
been sensitive is the extent to which the new relationship between
the two schools has been able to fulfill Episcopal expectations that
Yale Divinity School would continue to offer theological education
which was comparable, if not equivalent to that of other Episcopal
theological schools. Edward Sims and Richard Rising, who visited
the program on January 29-30, 1973 for the Board for Theological
Education of the Episcopal Church [BTE], questioned in their
report whether this was the right question to ask, but they knew
that it was a question being raised in the Episcopal constituency.
Their own answers to the question were clearly positive:
On the narrowest interpretation of Episcopal Chur.::h
responsibility, BDS qualifies ... If the question we ask were
to relate not so much to structure and its domination by
Episcopalians as to the capacity of the merger-produced in-
stitution to present the content of Anglican history, tradition
and ethos with respect and integrity, the answer in the case
of BDS would be yes. The cultivation of Anglican hubris is
doubtless more difficult in the kind of institution BDS now is:
I regard that as a significant plus ... It is my opinion that if
the BTE were to back away from support of BDS-Yale be-
cause of this merger, we would be letting our policy or our
timidity interfere with our goal of providing superior theo-
logical education for our postulants and candidates.
Although this evaluation understands the agreement to be an
affiliation, not a "merger," the conclusions from observation, inter-
views and administration of a student questionnaire in the Spring
of 1974 must be the same as those reached by the BTE visitors
in January, 1973.56
55. ld. at 4.
56. ld. at 11-12.
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0111 June 12, 1961, in Gilbert v. Burnside,57 three members58 of a
five judge panel in the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New
York, Second Department, concluded that:
The judgment below determines, in effect, that these financiers
(the Glen Alden directors) knew, or should have known, more
Pennsylvania law then eminent Pennsylvania counsel. There is no
evidence to support the Special Term's findings that the Glen
Alden directors knew that the plan was illegal, or that they did
not justifiably and in good faith rely on the advice of counsel
to the effect that the plan was legal even though it did not accord
the right of appraisal to dissenting shareholders.59
On May 10, 1962, the New York Court of Appeals, in a memo-
randum opinion, unanimously upheld what it characterized as the Ap-
pellate Division's "revers[al], on the law and on the facts ... [of]
a judgment of the Supreme Court,"60 thus ending
[t] his derivative action [which1 was originally commenced by
the stockholders of the Glen Alden Corporation, a corporation in-
corporated under the laws of Pennsylvania, to restrain the con-
summation of a reorganization agreement, dated March 20, 1958
.... [and in which, after Farris v. Glen Alden earp., 393 Pa. 4271
[t] he complaint . . . was . . . amended to charge defendants-
respondents, directors of the Glen Alden Corporation, with waste
in promulgating the invalid agreement and to demand recovery of
the expenses incurred by said corporation in negotiating, proposing
and defending it.61
As the Court of Appeals noted: "N0 appearance for corporate
respondent."lI!
57. 13 App. Div. 2d 982, 216 N.Y.S.2d 430 (1961), afJ'd, 11 N.Y.2d 960, 183
N.E.2d 325, 229 N.Y.S.2d 10 (1962).
58. The other two judges "dissent[ed] and vote[d] to affirm the judgment and
order upon the opinion of the learned Justice at Special Term." Id. at 983, 216
N.Y.S.2d at 433.
59. Id.
60. Gilbert v. Burnside, 11 N.Y.2d 960, 961, 183 N.E.2d 325, 326, 229 N.Y.S.2d
10, 11 (1962).
61. Id. at 961-62.
62. Id. at 962.
